We analyze the e¤ects of low-skill o¤shoring on welfare. In the context of a matching model with di¤erent possible equilibria, we discuss two alternative policies that could potentially outweigh the negative welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring, namely, a change of the unemployment bene…ts and the ‡exibilization of the labor market. Our calibrations for the German economy suggest that the ‡exibilization of the labor market can bring low-skill workers to pre-o¤shoring welfare levels by slightly reducing the vacancy costs, something that cannot be accomplished by meddling with the unemployment bene…ts scheme. In addition, we …nd that a full compensation can be achieved by an upgrading of low-skill workers, its size depending on the type of equilibrium involved. In sum, our analysis gives support to ‡exibilization and upgrading by education as best therapies for o¤shoring.
Introduction
Critics of o¤shoring are mainly concerned with the welfare e¤ects that these business practices can have on the population at large, but especially on low-skill low-wage workers. Active measures are usually called forth to palliate these negative e¤ects of globalization, but sometimes the remedy might turn out to be worse than the disease. This paper analyzes the welfare implications of the o¤shoring of low-skill activities, while discussing di¤erent usual counter measures with diverging results. We evaluate two particular policies that could potentially outweigh the e¤ects of o¤shoring, namely, a change in the level of unemployment bene…ts and a reduction of the vacancy costsbroadly understood here as the ‡exibilization of the labor market.
The policies we have chosen for discussion have been proposed on both sides of the political spectrum, and as with every other policy measure, they have been clumsily tailored for political advantage only to deal with di¢ culties in a short-time horizon. It is in this light that we aim at suggesting possible policy outcomes, while giving a word of warning which calls for discretion in coping with the o¤shoring 'threat'. 1 Notice that, in focusing on the e¤ects of o¤shoring and its immediate political reaction, we are emphasizing the interactions between trade and labor market policies for a hypothetical equilibrium. In order to account for some of the welfare improving e¤ects of o¤shoring-e.g. the future recycling of low-skill workers and their increase in productivity levels-we will allow for an exogenous upgrading of low-skill workers that can also be considered as a supplementary compensating mechanism to those o¤ered by the proposed policies.
We build on the previous literature of matching models like Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Rogerson et al. (2005) , and Davidson et al. (2008) . Albrecht and Vroman (2002) propose a matching model with endogenous skill requirements where employers create both high and low-skill vacancies and where the distribution of skill requirements across these vacancies is endogenous. It is also assumed that a low-skill job can be done by either type of worker whereas high-skill jobs can only be done by high-skill workers. Unemployment is generated by frictions and the meeting process (undirected) is taken from Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) , and Pissarides (2000) , while the wage-setting approach is of the Nash bargaining type. Low-skill workers are better o¤ the greater the fraction of low-skill vacancies, while the opposite is true for high-skill workers. Likewise, …rms with low-skill requirements are better o¤ the greater the fraction of low-skill job candidates.
We adapt and extend the model in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) to the case of low-skill o¤shoring, and then use di¤erent parameter combinations that render inter-esting comparative statics which can be used for policy recommendation analysis. In particular, we will focus the discussion on the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring for low-skill workers and the potential compensating mechanisms. As important as the welfare of those directly a¤ected by o¤shoring is, special attention must also be paid to the funding limitations that such compensating policies involve. For that reason, we extend the model as to account for the government …nancing of such policies, and then compare the alternative welfare outcomes produced by each of the alternatives. The objective is, when possible, to bring up the welfare of low-skill workers back to pre-o¤shoring levels.
In the context of Albrecht and Vroman (2002) , two equilibria will be discussed: the equilibrium with cross-skill matching (CSM) and the equilibrium with ex post segmentation (EPS). CSM occurs when high-skill workers and low-skill vacancies are matched, whereas EPS takes place when these potential matches do not meet (e.g. high-skill workers only work in high-skill jobs). Changing the model's parameters yields three scenarios: (i) a change from a CSM equilibrium to another; (ii) a switch from a CSM to an EPS equilibrium; and (iii) a change from an EPS equilibrium to another. These different scenarios, in combination with the policy measures, will produce di¤erent welfare e¤ects.
The o¤shoring literature has seen a recent surge in welfare analysis. For example, Mitra and Ranjan (2013) suggest that a reduction in the cost of o¤shoring increases o¤shoring and the unemployment of unskilled workers, but has a positive e¤ect on skilled workers in the form of higher wages and lower unemployment. Ranjan (2013a) argues that some employment protection policies can play an important role in protecting workers against external shocks like o¤shoring. He concludes that o¤shoring can reduce welfare even in the presence of optimal severance payments, and that some additional redistribution program might be needed to ensure welfare gains. He also points out that employment protection in the form of administrative cost of …ring fails to protect workers as it unambiguously reduces welfare. On the same line, Ranjan (2013b) suggests that when unemployment arises due to both job destruction and matching frictions, a combination of severance payments and unemployment bene…ts is a better policy to shield workers from o¤shoring than either of them alone. Jung and Mercenier (2014), in turn, analytically derive the conditions under which all workers, including low-skill, might gain from the surge of o¤shoring. Their main policy implication is that government action should aim at reducing market rigidities, rather than thwarting adjustment, something that calls, for instance, for extensive and ‡exible re-training programs.
It must be observed that o¤shoring indicators are not easy to come by, and that indirect indicators seem to be the best choice. For that reason we rely on an intermediate imports index, as originally proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) . Arguably, the higher the volume of intermediate trade the higher the o¤shoring intensity. The rationale goes as follows: as soon as 'relocated'business units start operating from abroad, the intensity of intra…rm trade, which mostly consists of parts, components, and other inputs previously produced in the home country, will grow substantially. Firms are thus responding to import competition from low-wage countries by moving their non-skill intensive activities to foreign locations from which they can later import back.
In order to produce a fair measure of low-skill o¤shoring, we restrict our o¤shoring index to the inputs originated in the manufacturing sector of the foreign country. As a result, we are able to determine the intensity of the o¤shoring of material inputs (or low-skill o¤shoring) as opposed to that of services-which is usually in the higher end of the skill ladder. According to our numbers, the o¤shoring of relatively low-skill materials-related activities turns out to be consistently higher than that of services for the group of countries considered. 2 Moreover, beyond what we get from the data, …rm theory holds that it is lower-skill activities that become redundant earlier and are thus at risk of being relocated …rst. Unlike Davidson et al. (2008) and Arseneau and Epstein (2014), we start from this hypothesis to lay out our model below and carry out our welfare analysis-that is, low-skill o¤shoring is signi…cantly more prominent than high-skill and, consequently, deserving of more attention in terms of welfare e¤ects. 3 To get an idea of the signi…cance of low-skill o¤shoring we calculate the indices for a group of highly developed countries, before laying out the model in full in the following sections. 4 For the purpose of calibrating our model we use German data, given that, as it clearly stands out in Figure 1 , Germany is at the forefront of low-skill o¤shoring practices while still having an important share of workers falling into the low and midskill categories. Figures 1a-c show the recent evolution of materials-based low-skill o¤shoring (vertical axis) along with the evolution of the skill share (horizontal axis). We use data on seven of the largest economies, with the size of the bubble indicating the country's GDP weight. Notice that unlike other countries Germany displays an unambiguous upward trend of low-skill o¤shoring (Figures 1a-c) and, at the same time, remains very high among the countries with a signi…cant pool of low and mid-skill level workers-this is clearly seen in Figure 1c , where Germany is positioned very high and to the right. Low-skill o¤shoring is likely to become a real issue in the near future, especially in places like Germany where the share of low to mid skill level workers is, even when decreasing, still non-trivial. Note: low-skill is below upper secondary level, mid is secondary and post-secondary, and high is tertiary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model, its main properties, and the possible types of equilibria are discussed in section 2. We brie ‡y outline the strategy for the solution of the model in section 3. The welfare e¤ects of the proposed policies as well as the additional exercise on skill upgrading are studied in section 4. Final remarks are summarized in section 5.
Model
We adapt the model in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) to account for the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring. 5 We also extend the model by introducing the public sector in response to the …nancing of the proposed compensation policies. In short, our model considers three types of agents: workers, …rms, and the government. Workers are in…nitely lived and of measure one. An exogenous fraction q of these workers is low-skill, L; and the rest are high-skill, H: A worker of type i; i = L or H; searching for a job, seeks to maximize the expected lifetime discounted utility function
where 0 < < 1 is the discount factor and x it is consumption of type i at time t: Consumption is equal to the expected net income in each period, so saving is not possible.
There is free entry for …rms and each …rm employs one worker when active. A vacancy can be opened at an exogenous cost c, and …rms place vacancies of both skill types. A fraction of vacancies is low-skill and a fraction 1 is high-skill and their distribution is endogenous. A …rm of type i; i = L or H; maximizes its expected lifetime discounted pro…ts
where it are pro…ts obtained by a …rm of type i at time t: Further, if a …rm hires a worker to occupy a low-skill vacancy the level of output is y L , if it hires a worker to …ll a high-skill vacancy then the level of output is y H : High-skill …rms are more productive than their low-skill counterparts, thus y H > y L : A high-skill worker is allowed to take both types of jobs, whereas a low-skill worker can only …ll a vacancy that corresponds to his type. If a worker of any type is employed, he gets a wage corresponding to the type of vacancy and the type of skills he has. A worker of type L (H) working in a job of type L (H) will get a wage w L (w H ): A worker of type H working in an L type job will get w L(H) : Wages earned by high-skill mismatched workers will be usually higher than wages of low-skill workers matched correctly with a low-skill job, hence w H > w L(H) > w L :
6 If a worker is unemployed he is entitled to an exogenously given unemployment bene…t b, and any worker can refuse the job if his reservation wage is not met. Moreover, jobs are lost at an exogenous rate . Firms and workers meet according to a matching technology M (u; v) where u represents unemployed workers (unemployment rate) and v vacancies. In this process an endogenously determined fraction of unemployed workers will be low-skill. In addition, arrival of jobs to workers happens at a rate
and arrival of workers to employers at a rate
If we de…ne market tightness as = v u
, we can rewrite the job arrival rate to workers as m(1; v u ) = m( ) and the workers'arrival rate to …rms as
In our model, the government collects taxes from employed workers and transfers all the revenues in the form of unemployment bene…ts to idle workers. Depending on the necessary funds for the unemployment package, an endogenous ‡at tax rate is applied to all wages, balancing out the government budget constraint at all times.
If the match succeeds, the employed worker's expected lifetime utility is W i and the active …rm's expected lifetime pro…ts are J i ; i = L; H or L(H); where i = L stands for a match between a low-skill worker and a low-technology …rm, i = H is a match between a high-skill worker and a high-technology …rm, and i = L(H) is the case where a highskill worker matches with a low-skill …rm. The worker's utility stems from earning the net wage (1 ) w i ; whereas the …rm's pro…ts stem from the di¤erence between production and incurred costs, to wit, wages and search, that is y i w i c:
Both workers and …rms take into account that the match can be broken with probability : If the match does not succeed, an unemployed worker's expected lifetime utility is U j and the expected lifetime pro…ts of a vacant …rm are V j ; j = L or H: In this case the worker's utility comes from earning the unemployment bene…ts b, and the …rm's (negative) pro…ts come from …nancing a vacancy, c: Workers and …rms assume that a new match can occur for workers with a probability p W j and a new match can occur for …rms with a probability p F j . We thus have that W i stands for the value of working and U j for the value of unemployment, while J i stands for the value of the job and V j for the value of the vacancy of the corresponding type. There is something to bargain over if the value of working is higher than the value of unemployment,
and when the value of the job is higher than the value of the vacancy,
Wages are set to maximize the weighted surplus of workers and …rms in a Nash bargaining process
where the weighting parameter represents the bargaining power of workers.
In the case of a successful match the Bellman equations for employed workers and active …rms of type i; i = L; H or L(H); are
respectively. In the case of an unsuccessful match, the Bellman equations for unem-ployed workers and vacant …rms of type i are
respectively. Bellman equations for the utility and pro…t maximization problems are written in discrete time. In what follows we will rewrite them into the continuous form. In order to do so, we take into account the relationship between the discount factor and the discount rate r;
Steady State Equilibrium
Workers may experience spells of employment and unemployment. When the ‡ow of workers into and out of each employment state coincide the steady-state equilibrium is achieved. In the steady state, low-skill workers that were working,
and lose their jobs, equal the low-skill unemployed, q E L ; that …nd a job (right hand side)
and high-skill workers that were working,
and lose their jobs, equal the high-skill unemployed, 1 q E H ; that …nd a job (right hand side)
where p W L and p W H are the probabilities to …nd a job for low and high-skill workers, respectively.
In the described setup two types of equilibria may be realized: the equilibrium with cross skill matching (CSM) and the equilibrium with ex post segmentation (EPS). CSM occurs when high-skill workers and low-skill vacancies match, while EPS takes place when these potential matches do not meet, i.e. high-skill workers only work in high-skill jobs. The type of equilibria achieved depends on the expectations of high-skill workers about the labor market and their willingness to accept a low-skill job.
Cross Skill Matching Equilibrium
Let us describe the equilibrium equations when high-skill workers are willing to take low-skill jobs and low-skill …rms can a¤ord to pay them.
The probability that a low-skill worker will match with a low-skill …rm is
and the probability that a high-skill worker will match with either a low or high-skill …rm is
By rewriting (8) and (10), and using (7), (9), (11) and (12), we get the expressions for the unemployment rate and the fraction of low-skill vacancies (as in Albrecht and Vroman, 2002)
Rewriting (2) and using (6) for each particular case, we obtain the equations that characterize the match between low and high-skill workers with low and high-technology …rms
where the discounted value of working must be equal to the ‡ow of net income and the expected loss from changing the employment status. Subscripts L and H characterize low and high-skill workers, respectively, matched in the corresponding …rms; and L(H) stands for high-skill workers mismatched in low-skill jobs. Rewriting (4) and using (6) we get the corresponding equations for unemployed workers
where the discounted value of being unemployed must be equal to the ‡ow of income (unemployment bene…ts) and the expected gain from …nding a job. Rewriting (3) and using (6) , the Bellman equations for the active …rms are
where the discounted value of the job must be equal to the ‡ow of pro…ts earned by the active …rm and the expected loss from changing the labor market status (becoming inactive). Rewriting (5) and using (6), we get the corresponding equations for the inactive …rms
where the discounted value of the vacancy must be equal to the ‡ow of income lost by maintaining the vacancy open and the expected gain from switching to the active status. There is free entry into the market, and new …rms enter while the value of the vacancy is positive. No more …rms enter as the value of the vacancy decreases to zero; the free entry condition can be then expressed as
Wages for each type of match can be obtained by processing (15)- (17), (20)- (22), and (25), and by plugging them into (1)
Notice that the wage of a mismatched worker, w L(H) ; is lower than the one of a correctly matched high-skill worker, w H ; because of the former's lower productivity. Notice also that the wage of a mismatched worker, w L(H) ; is higher than the wage of a correctly matched low-skill worker, w L -this is so because high-skill workers have better employ- 8 Maximizing (1), one gets the following …rst order condition
Using (15)- (17), (20)- (22) and their derivatives, together with the free entry condition (25), we get the expressions for the corresponding wages. ment options if they become unemployed, and the …rm must then compensate for this fact.
The government taxes the wages of all employed workers at a ‡at rate ; and distributes all the revenues to the unemployed workers in the form of bene…ts b;
The condition for the CSM equilibrium to exist is that matches between high-skill workers and low-skill jobs are realized. This happens when
De…nition 1 In Cross Skill Matching (CSM) steady-state equilibrium, the following must hold: (i) workers'Bellman equations (15), (16), (17), (18) and (19), (ii) …rms'Bellman equations (20), (21), (22), (23) and (24), (iii) Nash bargaining conditions (26), (27) and (28), (iv) steady state conditions (8), (10), (11), and (12), (v) free entry conditions (25), (vi) government budget constraint (29) and (vii) CSM equilibrium condition (30).
10
We evaluate separately the unemployment rates of both types of workers, the lowskill unemployment rate
and the high-skill unemployment rate
In CSM steady-state equilibrium the aggregate level of output is 11 9 Conditions J L(H) > V L and W L(H) > U H must hold. We can obtain the CSM equilibrium condition by processing the corresponding Bellman equations. 10 For the set of exogenous parameters fb; c; q; r; y L ; y H; ; ; ; m( ); z( )g the equlibrium conditions determine the set of endogenous values 
Given that we are interested in measuring welfare, we evaluate the expected lifetime utility of the average low-skill worker,
CSM L
; and that of the average high-skill worker,
The overall welfare CSM is the weighted sum of the two,
Ex Post Segmentation Equilibrium
Let us now describe the equilibrium equations when high-skill workers are only matching with high-skill …rms. The probability that a low-skill worker will match with a low-skill …rm does not change, so eq. (11) still holds, but the probability of forming a match for a high-skill worker is lower,
as these workers do not apply to low-skill vacancies anymore. The implied unemployment rate and the fraction of low-skill vacancies are, respectively
The Bellman equations that characterize the employed workers are (15) and (16), and the corresponding equations for unemployed workers are (18) and
The Bellman equations for the active …rm are (20) and (21), and for the inactive …rm
and (24) . 12 The zero vacancy condition (25) must also hold, and wages are determined by (26) and (27). Furthermore, the government budget constraint becomes
Finally, the condition for EPS equilibrium to exist is that high-skill workers are matching only with high-skill jobs
De…nition 2 In Ex Post Segmentation (EPS) steady-state equilibrium, the following must hold: (i) workers'Bellman equations (15), (16), (18) and (34), (ii) …rms'Bellman equations (20), (21), (35) and (24), (iii) Nash bargaining conditions (26) and (27), (iv) steady state conditions (8), (10), (11) 
and (31), (v) zero vacancy value conditions (25), (vi) government budget constraint (36) and (vii) EPS equilibrium condition (37).
Under the EPS steady-state equilibrium the aggregate level of output is
and the welfare equations of the average low-skill and high-skill workers,
EP S L and

EP S H
; are
and
The overall welfare EP S is the weighted sum of the two, as before
Solving the model
The model can be solved numerically. In order to do so we need to specify the matching function. We assume that M (u; v) = 2 p uv; which implies m( ) = 2 p and (38)
Using the Bellman equations for the expected lifetime utility of a vacant …rm, (23) and (24) for the CSM equilibrium, and (35) and (24) for the EPS equilibrium, and the free entry condition (25), we obtain the following
when
for the CSM equilibrium, and
for the EPS equilibrium. Combining all the corresponding equilibrium equations we obtain the combinations of and ; or = f V L =0 ( ); for which (40) or (42) hold, and the combinations of and ; or = f V H =0 ( ); for which (41) or (43) hold too. In general, for 2 (0; 1); = f V L =0 ( ) is increasing and = f V H =0 ( ) is decreasing. The intersection of the two loci determines the fraction of low-skill unemployed and the market tightness . Once these two values are known, the solution of the model can be obtained using the corresponding equilibrium conditions. 13 
Calibration and comparative statics
In the o¤shoring literature o¤shoring is often identi…ed as a source of skill-biased technical change. In our setting, skill-biased technical change can be seen as an increase of output produced in high-skill jobs while the output of low-skill jobs remains constant. Similarly, this can also be represented as a fall in the productivity levels of low-skill workers while keeping the productivity of high-skill workers …xed. Hence, introducing cheap imports due to a liberalization process or the increase of o¤shoring will reduce the value of the output of low-skill jobs. 14 In this section we calibrate our model to the German economy during 2000-2014. We use the following baseline parameters: the rate at which the employment relationship is broken is = 0:09; meaning that jobs last on average 11 years; agents discount the future at a constant rate r = 0:023; which corresponds to the average real interest rate in the data; there are q = 0:745 low-skill workers in the labor force (the average value of workers with below upper secondary and secondary education in 2000 and 2011); and the bargaining power of workers is the same as that of the …rms, = 0:5; so the Hocios condition holds:
Further, the output produced by high-skill workers in a high-skill …rm is assumed to be y H = 1:2: The value of the output in a low-skill …rm will change in order to generate a CSM or an EPS equilibrium. 15 We choose an output gap of 20 percent for the calibration of the parameters. Thus, the baseline productivity of low-skill workers is y L = 1: Unemployment bene…ts in Germany amount to around 63 percent of previously perceived wages-the parameter b that leads to such a value is b = 0:5: Moreover, the cost of opening a vacancy is set at c = 0:25; implying an equilibrium unemployment rate of 8 percent, which is roughly equal to the average value found in the data. When simulating the e¤ects of o¤shoring, we open the productivity gap between high and low-skill workers and aim to 'destroy'15 percent of the low-skill vacancies :
E¤ects of o¤shoring
We carry out a comparative statics exercise to account for di¤erent policy measures that can possibly compensate for the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring. The purpose of this exercise is to theoretically examine the e¤ects of o¤shoring on the whole economy and on low-skill workers in particular.
We describe three possible scenarios: (i) the movement from a CSM equilibrium to another CSM; (ii) a switch from a CSM equilibrium to an EPS equilibrium; and (iii) the movement from an EPS equilibrium to another EPS. Notice that in the cases (i) and (ii) we might end up with a set of parameters where both equilibria are possible, and where the actual outcome depends on the expectations of high-skill workers about the economy and their willingness to accept, or not, a low-skill job.
Let us now preview the general initial e¤ects of o¤shoring in our model-that is, prior to any compensating policy measure. As seen in Tables 1 and 2 , a reduction in 14 Remember that o¤shoring intensity can be measured as an intermediate imports ratio as we did above. 15 Notice that the EPS equilibrium is more likely to exist when the productivity gap between the two types of workers is high, i.e. when y H >> y L ; and consequently the wages in low-skill …rms are too low to entice high-skill workers into these jobs. the productivity of low-skill workers yields the following qualitative results: 1) it raises the overall and low-skill unemployment rates, u and u L ; 2) it reduces the fraction of vacancies that are low-skill, ; 3) it brings down the wages in low-skill jobs, w L and w L(H) ; 4) it cuts production down, Y ; and 5) it reduces overall and 'low-skill'welfare, and L (Table 2) . Note that the changes in the unemployment rate, wages and welfare of high-skill workers depend on the kind of equilibrium-they all worsen under CSM but improve when switching to EPS.
We now proceed to analyze three comparative statics exercises, involving appreciably di¤erent policy measures with quite di¤erent outcomes-a change of the unemployment bene…ts, a reduction of the vacancy costs, and the skill upgrading of low-skill workers. 
Policy 1: Unemployment Bene…ts
It is a well-known fact that an increase in the unemployment bene…ts b increases the reservation wage of workers and thus obliges …rms to pay them more. Naturally, this has a positive a¤ect on the worker's utility but, on the other hand, it also induces workers to remain idle. Besides, to …nance the increase of b taxes need to be raised, thus reducing the workers'net income. As a result, a negative e¤ect of taxes can prevail. Conversely, lowering b increases the net wages of both types of workers, even when this increase will not be enough to compensate for the decrease in utility experimented by the o¤shoring-related displaced workers. Figure 2 summarizes the results, for both the equilibria discussed, of our calibration on the welfare of low-skill workers using German data. We conclude that changing the level of unemployment bene…ts to higher or lower levels (horizontal axes in Figure  2 ) turns out to be ine¤ective for compensating workers for the loss of welfare due to o¤shoring-leaving a permanent 'welfare gap' between the original equilibrium (bold point in Figure 2 ) and the 'o¤shoring equilibria'(depicted by the continuous and dotted lines in Figure 2 ). Figure 3 adds some color to our previous exercise and shows how active governments have been for the last 15 years in relation to labor market policies in general. Unlike in other countries, Germany has committed itself to a substantial reduction in its active and passive policy measures. According to OECD data, German public expenditure involving active and passive measures has fallen more than 1 percentage point of GDP during that period. This, however, would fall short of a complete recovery in terms of the welfare of low-skill workers, as previously seen in Figure 2 . Let us now turn our attention to our second policy alternative: an increase in labor market ‡exibility. 
Policy 2: Labor market ‡exibility
Let us discuss the e¤ects of the ‡exibilization of the labor market by way of a reduction of the vacancy costs c. A fall of y L due to o¤shoring-that is, one that generates a 15 percent drop in the share of low-skill vacancies ( ) as assumed earlier-results in a welfare loss that can be completely o¤set by a cutback of the vacancy costs. 17 As in the previous exercise, we are interested in a compensating mechanism that would bring the welfare of the low-skill group back to its pre-o¤shoring level. As seen in Figure 4 , this can be achieved by allowing for a reduction in the vacancy costs-in terms of the …gures this is accomplished when the lines intersect the value given by the vertical axes at which the original equilibria stand (bold dots). The size of the cutback depends on the equilibria involved and range from 13 percent in the CSM-CSM case (continuous line left panel), to 19 and 20 percent when CSM-EPS (dotted line left panel) and EPS-EPS (right panel) respectively.
Flexibilization encourages hiring and this, in our setting, would drive wages up. The raise would be extensive to both low and high-skill workers yet, the truth be told, it would fall more largely on the latter. Regardless, welfare in general is increased as a result of ‡exibilization and the welfare of low-skill workers in particular can be brought back to pre-o¤shoring levels.
18 17 See Tables 1 and 2 above for the quantitative e¤ects of o¤shoring in terms of employment, wages, and welfare. 18 We have a sizable amount of data from our calibrations that is available on request. The main Figure 5 shows the changes in the level of employment protection for the same group of countries as in the previous sections. We can see that employment protection has generally moved toward less ‡exibility in recent years, with Germany in particular moving slightly but consistently on the higher end-something which is clearly at odds with mitigating the welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring. Notice that even when c in our model simply refers to the cost of creating and maintaining a vacancy, it is still accounted for in the OECD strictness indicator as this point for us, however, was to show that the policy presented here seems to be achievable and within the reach of most policy makers.
includes both the regulations on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts-the latter having a direct impact on the hiring process of …rms. Vacancy costs usually include advertisement, the time cost of the internal recruiter, the time cost taken by the interviews, drugs screens and background checks, and various pre-employment assessment tests.
As for the indicator presented here, a reduction of the vacancy cost may be brought about by loosening up the regulations involving temporary workers, as this will probably reduce the administrative burden faced by the …rms. Likewise, employment subsidies seem bound to have the same e¤ect on hiring (Phelps, 1994) , this time at the expense of the taxpayer or lower welfare entitlements. Finally, it can be argued too that reducing the …ring costs can bring c down as this can be broadly thought of as including the costs which …rms will have to face sooner or later. Labor market policies can strongly de…ne the pattern of trade and the e¤ects of trade in general (see Helpman and Itskhoki, 2007) , and o¤shoring is just another form of trade. 
Addendum: Upgrading of low-skill workers
Skill upgrading can be understood as a change in relative wages, favoring the high-skill, re ‡ecting a change in productivity levels. 20 An expected outcome of o¤shoring involves the recycling and upgrading of those low-skill workers who have lost their jobs. To be sure, once those low-skill jobs have been relocated, …rms will have more room for new goods and services that will be produced with new technologies using higher skill requirements. Workers who are able to seize the opportunity by getting trained in new skills and thus by becoming high-skill workers will eventually command higher wages.
Here we pose a very simple question. Assuming that the o¤shoring threat will make low-skill workers seek to change their status to high-skill, then how much of a drop in the share of low-skill workers q will be needed to compensate for the welfare loss of o¤shoring? 21 Given that low-skill workers are now able to move up the skill ladder our policy goal will be total welfare ( ). The workers that remain low-skill, however, will still bear considerable welfare losses. Table 3 presents the results of our calibration for Germany, in a similar way as we did before. 19 Davidson and Matusz (2006) evaluate the e¤ects of four di¤erent policies in the broader context of globalization: unemployment bene…ts, training subsidies, employment or wage subsidies. They conclude that wage subsidies are the preferred policy as they give the highest incentive for re-employment. 20 Empirical evidence on this subject abounds; see, among several others, Berman et al. (1994) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996) 21 Notice that high-skill workers, even when in low-skill occupations, can still command higher wages than low-skill workers, or w L(H) > w L . Be also aware that the mechanism by which workers react to o¤shoring by improving their skills is considered exogenous. Note: O¤shoring is, as before, assumed to be equal to a drop in the productivity of low-skill workers y L that generates a 15% drop in the share of low-skill vacancies :
The uppermost segment of the table shows that the economy remains at a CSM equilibrium as long as q 0:715; and that lower levels of q lead to a switch CSM-EPS. Notice that only when switching into the EPS equilibrium the pre-o¤shoring level of welfare can be achieved-this is seen on the second segment of the upper panel and on the bottom panel under 'skill upgrading'. Respectively, the share of low-skill workers q needs to go down to around 49 (CSM-EPS) and 55 percent (EPS-EPS) to get back to the initial welfare level. Figure 6 shows a clear trend pointing in the direction of skill upgrading of lowskill workers since the early 2000s. Seemingly, people are fast adapting to the ever increasing requirements of globalized …rms by acquiring more skills by way of higher levels of education. In the particular case of Germany, special concern should be placed on the still high share of relatively low to mid-skill segments of the population-the second highest in the sample as of 2011.
It can be argued that in the lack of a consensus from the majority of the political forces to e¤ect one of the two alternatives previously discussed, there is still the possibility of upgrading for those at the bottom of the skill ladder. This, as we can see, will likely bring welfare to pre-o¤shoring levels. Of course, this upgrading can also be encouraged by a combination of policies aimed at the re-employment of dismissed workers (see, among others, Phelps, 1994, Davidson and Matusz, 2006 , and Jung and Mercenier, 2014). Notes: low is below upper secondary level, mid is secondary and post-secondary, and high is tertiary.
Conclusions
We have relied on a matching model to perform a quantitative analysis of the e¤ects of low-skill o¤shoring on the welfare of the economy. We have adapted and extended the model by Albrecht and Vroman (2002) to assess the e¤ect of two government policies: unemployment bene…ts and labor market ‡exibilization.
We have shown that, in the case of Germany, the welfare loss due to low-skill o¤-shoring can be compensated by a ‡exibilization policy-it would only take a relatively small reduction in the vacancy cost to achieve the pre-o¤shoring welfare levels. Unemployment bene…ts, on the other hand, cannot compensate for the negative welfare e¤ects of o¤shoring as the positive e¤ects of higher bene…ts is o¤set by the negative e¤ect of its …nancing. Thus, the recommended welfare improving tool is ‡exibilization, which also implies work incentives and an increase in economic activity.
Furthermore, an additional exercise reveals that if low-skill workers adjust themselves to higher skill requirements (upgrading) the welfare loss can also be compensated. These adjustments vary widely and depend on the equilibria involved, and could be encouraged by re-employment and re-training programs as discussed in the text.
Appendix
Solution of the model: Cross Skill Matching Equilibrium Taking into account (25) and rewriting (20) , (21) and (22) we get
Using (18) and (19) in combination with (26)- (28) and (15)- (17) we can write 
Plugging (44), (46), (26), (28), (47), (39), (14) and (38) into (40) we get the combination of and for which the free entry condition for low-skill workers holds, = f V L =0 ( )
where = p L is given in (14) . It is a third degree polynomial in p L : Given that b; c; q; r; y L ; ; and are predetermined, this polynomial gives us the value of p L for a given . We solve it numerically. Plugging (45), (27), (48), (39), (14) and (38) into (41) we get the combination of and for which the free entry condition for high-skill workers holds, = f V H =0 ( ) V H = 0 locus: 0 = H 2c (r + ) ( This locus is a second degree polynomial in p H : An analytical solution is applied.
Solution of the model: Ex Post Segmentation Equilibrium
Taking into account (25) and rewriting (20) and (21) we get (44) and (45). Using (18) and (19) in combination with (26), (27), (15) and (16) 
Plugging (44), (26), (47), (39), (33) and (38) into (42) we get the combination of and for which the free entry condition for low-skill workers holds, = f V L =0 ( ) V L = 0 locus: 0 = L 2c (1 ) q ( Plugging (45), (27), (49), (39), (33) and (38) into (43) we get the combination of and for which the free entry condition for high-skill workers holds, = f V H =0 ( ) V H = 0 locus: 0 = H 2c (r + ) (1 ) ( 1 q 
